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New quantum cryptography, often called Y-00 protocol, has much higher performance than the
conventional quantum cryptographies. It seems that the conventional quantum cryptographic at-
tacks are inefficient at Y-00 protocol as its security is based on the different grounds from that of the
conventional ones. We have, then, tried to cryptoanalyze Y-00 protocol in the view of cryptographic
communication system. As a result, it turns out that the security of Y-00 protocol is equivalent to
that of classical stream cipher.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Lc, 42.50.Ar
Quantum cryptography has appeared as a promising
way to achieve security without depending on any com-
putational complexity assumption. However, most of the
proposed schemes up to date are based on single photon
states (QCSPS) thus, presenting a well-known negative
characteristic, namely, its bit rate is much slower than
that of normal optical communication systems.
Recently a quantum cryptography scheme which uses
mesoscopic coherent states has been reported [1, 2, 3, 4].
This scheme has much higher performance than conven-
tional ones which are based on single photon states[5,
6, 7]. Because this scheme based on mesoscopic coher-
ent states, often called “Y-00 protocol[8],” has an aver-
age photon number of 100-1,000 photons per pulse, its
bit rate is expected to be 100-1,000 times faster than
that of QCSPS. In addition, the required technical level
to realize the protocol is supposed to be quite the same
as in conventional optical systems. Y-00 protocol would
be, then, a sufficiently fast and easily realizable quantum
cryptography scheme, if it had actually perfect security.
In this paper, we show that the Y-00 protocol does
not provide perfect security, even against the simplest
of cryptographic attacks, ciphertext-only ones. A usual
cryptographic system consists of two channels (Fig.1): an
open channel for exchanging encrypted messages and a
secure channel for key distribution. Quantum cryptog-
raphy based protocols, including Y-00 protocol, provide
a realization of the secure channel for key distribution.
Let us underline that our attack targets are not only the
secure channel, but also the open channel for messages.
We also show that the security of Y-00 protocol is just
equivalent to that of a classical stream cipher. In other
words, we can safely say that Y-00 protocol has no per-
fect security and that its security depends on just a com-
mon computational complexity assumption, being then
no better than currently used schemes.
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FIG. 1: Cryptographic communication system
Y-00 protocol is a quantum key expansion (QKE)
scheme. Both Alice and Bob must share a secret key
Ks in advance. Notice that, even conventional quantum
cryptography can be regarded as quantum key expansion
schemes, since a short key is needed for the authentica-
tion of the classical channel. Y-00 protocol uses the se-
cret key for quantum modulation and de-modulation in
a quantum channel for expansion of the key.
Y-00 protocol has, then, 2M non-orthogonal coherent
states called “qumodes” :
|αeiθk〉, θk = pik/M, (1)
where α ∈ C and k ∈ {0, . . . , 2M − 1}, or
|Ψ(θk)〉 = |α cos θk/2〉H |α sin θk/2〉V , (2)
in the polarization coding where the suffix “H” and “V”
are horizontal and vertical polarization modes. We focus
on the polarization coding hereafter.
The 2M -states are divided into M -pairs:
|α cos θk/2〉H |α sin θk/2〉V , (3)
and
|α cos θM+k/2〉H |α sin θM+k/2〉V , (4)
2where k ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1} and the pairs are orthogonal
to each other. A specific pair, then, determines a specific
polarization base.
At first Alice and Bob generate a pseudo-random num-
ber stream ki ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1} from the secret key Ks
in synchronized manner:
PRNG : Ks → ki, i ∈ N , (5)
where PRNG is a pseudo-random number generator and
the number ki determines the polarization base. Alice
generates a number ri ∈ {0, 1} with a physical random
number generator (PhRNG) and modulates the ri into a
qumode in the ki-base. Bob observes the qumode sent
from Alice with the ki-base and de-modulates ri from the
qumode. The mechanism is called “M-ary level cipher-
ing.”
Y-00 protocol has another important mechanism called
“Ciphering Wheel.” Ciphering Wheel is a rule for assign-
ing bits 0 and 1 of ri to two qumodes on each base. Two
closest qumodes in the neighboring bases are generally
assigned opposite bit values. Thus one must distinguish
a correct qumode to get a correct bit. However, because
of the fundamental quantum fluctuation in any measure-
ment by eavesdroppers, the discrimination of the qumode
is impossible for eavesdroppers when M is sufficiently
large, unless they know the information of ki.
These circumstances can be easily understood with the
so-called Poincare´ representation. The qumode is repre-
sented by a point on the Poincare´ sphere and all qumodes
are located on the equator including the z-axis and x-axis
defined by the Stokes operators in Fig.2:
Sz =
1
2
(a†a− b†b), and Sx = 1
2
(a†b+ b†a), (6)
where a is an annihilation operator for the horizontal
mode and b is an annihilation operator for the vertical
mode. The qumode (2) is, then, represented by the point
(Sz, Sx) =
1
2
|α|2(cos θk, sin θk), (7)
and it has the following isotropic quantum fluctuation
∆Sz = ∆Sx =
1
2
|α|. (8)
Nσ-other qumodes are included in the fluctuation where
Nσ = M/(pi|α|) and no one can distinguish the correct
qumode from the others. Therefore nobody except Alice
and Bob draw out the correct bit whereas Bob’s decision
has to be made only between two nearly orthogonal state
in the same basis defined by a given ki [1].
From the above argument, one can see that Alice and
Bob can surely safely share the new random bits {ri}
whose length is longer than the original shared random
common keyKs. Alice and Bob seem to be able to realize
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FIG. 2: qumode in Poincare´ sphere at M = 16
QKE by using the Y-00 protocol. However, a careful
consideration tells us that this protocol doesn’t help Alice
and Bob to expand their key in a perfect secure way.
Let us imagine that Eve classifies the bases into two
classes: The one class C+ consists of bases which has the
same bit-assignment as the ki = 0 base and the other
class C− consists of the rest of the bases. She can, then,
define a mono-bit mapping CW (·) from the base ki:
CW : ki → k˜i =
{
0 if ki ∈ C+
1 if ki ∈ C− . (9)
Since Eve seizes the qumode and its base vaguely, she,
then, selects an appropriate base which belongs to the
class C+ from the candidates and gets a bit li from ob-
servation under the selected base. Since the candidates
are not always the same as the true bases, the bit li can-
not always be equal to ri. However one will find that the
following important relation holds:
li = ri ⊕ k˜i. (10)
Notice that the quantum error due to the miss choice
of base is absorbed in the second term of the right side.
Moreover, since the inner product of the true qumode
|Ψ(θk)〉 and the orthogonal qumode on the incorrect base
k +∆k is given by
|〈Ψ(θk)|Ψ(θM+k+∆k)〉|2 = e−2|α|
2(1+sin(pi∆k/2M)), (11)
(the product is extremely small if the qumode is a meso-
scopic state where the order of ∆k is at most Nσ), the
error derived from M-ary ciphering mechanism is negli-
gible.
In addition, Eve can make her measurement unde-
tectable by Alice and Bob, by resending a similar quan-
tum state to Bob who is interested in only the discrimi-
nation of the possible two states. In principle, Bob can
3check if the state is really one of two possible state, if
the quantum channel can be assumed free from noise.
However, it is much harder to check it than only to dis-
tinguish from each other. Moreover, it requires much
higher technology than what is assumed in the original
Y-00 protocol. Also, the assumption that the quantum
channel is free from noise is a quite unrealistic one.
Again, we would like to stress that the detection of
Eve’s measurement is impossible for Alice and Bob under
the relevant assumptions assumed in the Y-00 protocol,
paying serious attention to the philosophy of the origi-
nal proposal, that is, an easily realizable protocol with
conventional optical technologies. Also, note that signal
amplification, which is considered as one of the mains
advantages of the protocol, is impossible under the as-
sumption that Eve’s activities can be detected.
There is a small technical problem that the classifica-
tion is not globally well-defined because the base space
is topologically homomorphic to the Mo¨bius ring. The
vertical polarization mode on the k = 0 base is adjacent
to the horizontal one on the k =M − 1 base, though the
base space has cyclic structure of a module M . However
one can solve this problem, by introducing the follow-
ing “local” classification in the neighborhood of a given
k-base in Fig.3:
1. Fix the most far base kcut ≡ k + [M/2] modM as
the cut base if a certain k is given.
2. Classify each bases from k = 0 to kcut in both ad-
ditive and subtractive directions.
The local classification is well-defined in the neighbor-
hood of k and unique on any k. It is no problem that the
neighborhood of kcut is ill-defined because the qumodes
on the k-base and kcut are orthogonal to each other, i.e.
|〈Ψ(θk)|Ψ(θkcut〉|2 ≃ e−(2−
√
2)|α|2 → 0. (12)
k=M-1
k=0
k
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FIG. 3: Local Classification on bases at M = 16
Let us recall the important fact that, in the Y-00 pro-
tocol, Eve can get (10) without being detected by Alice
and Bob. First of all, one should notice that this situa-
tion can be simulated in a classical way.
Let us investigate the Y-00 protocol as a cryptographic
communication system where one-time pad is used as en-
cryption algorithm for messages in Fig.4.
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FIG. 4: Y-00 communication system
Eve gets two clues to cryptanalysis: One clue is a ci-
phertext ci of the message:
ci = pi ⊕ ri, (13)
where pi is a plaintext of the message which is legible
to anybody and has often language characteristics. The
other clue is an inaccurate qumode that Eve observes in
the quantum channel.
As Eve knows the two bit streams (13) and (10) in this
way, she gets another bit stream
ci ⊕ li = pi ⊕ k˜i. (14)
The bit stream is nothing but a classical stream cipher
where ci ⊕ li is a ciphertext, k˜i is a key stream, and its
generator algorithm is CW ◦ PRNG(·). Therefore Y-00
protocol has no perfect security and its security is based
on computational complexity.
The above discussion is independent of the encryption
algorithm. In the case of a block cipher algorithm instead
of one-time pad, we may observe (10) in a block whose
size is N
LJ = RJ ⊕ K˜J , (15)
where ⊕ is bitwise XOR and LJ , RJ , and K˜J are con-
catenations of lis, ris, and k˜is, for example,
LJ = l(J−1)N+1||l(J−1)N+2|| · · · ||lJN . (16)
The ciphertext is given by
CJ = ERJ (PJ ), and PJ = DRJ (CJ ), (17)
where PJ and CJ are block sequences instead of each bit
streams and E(·), D(·) are encryption and decryption
algorithm. We, then, get the following relation
PJ = DLJ⊕K˜J (CJ ), (18)
4instead of the simple relation (14). Brute-force attack on
the freedom of Ks is applicable to (18) in the worst case
that we have no clue to cryptoanalyze the encryption
algorithm. Therefore its security is never beyond that of
a scheme based on computational complexity.
This attack is not applicable to QCSPS like BB84 be-
cause it has the feature of eavesdropping detection. QC-
SPS with non-separable carrier abandons the communi-
cation itself as soon as eavesdropping is detected.
It is interesting to analyze our results in comparison
to the ones related to secret key agreement over classical
noisy channels. It is known that certain noisy correlated
data can provide finite secrecy capacity and perfect se-
cure key agreement between Alice and Bob even when
the correlation between Alice and Eve is less noisy than
the correlation between Alice and Bob (if an authenti-
cated noiseless public channel is provided) [9, 10, 11, 12].
Y-00 protocol would be, then, expected as a practical
and efficient implementation of this noisy correlation us-
ing quantum noise. The result (10), however, tells us
that the correlation implemented by Y-00 protocol is not
a stochastic one but one which comes from a determin-
istic bit-flip channel owing to the local classification and
the appropriate base-selection. Therefore, Y-00 protocol
does not provide “genuine” noisy correlations between
Alice, Bob and Eve and, hence, does not satisfy the con-
ditions specified in[9, 10, 11, 12].
We assume that qumodes are mesoscopic, |α|2 ≫ 1
in the above discussion. If |α|2 is sufficient small, quan-
tum effects are expected to be no longer negligible. In
our attack, if the two qumodes on the most far base
kcut are not efficiently orthogonal to the true qumode:
|α|2 < 1 + 1/√2 from (12) , the clue (10) is not cor-
rect and the eavesdropping channel becomes a stochastic
noisy channel. Y-00 protocol would, then, recover per-
fect security if it used microscopic coherent states instead
of mesoscopic ones, but its extremely high performance
would be lost.
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